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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-PERSONAL SEARCH OF SUSPECT INCIDENT TO
CUSTODIAL ARREST IS PER SE "REASONABLE" AND REQUIRES No ADDI-
TIONAL JUSTIFICATION-United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
Police routinely search suspects placed under arrest.' A search
.made incident to a valid arrest has long been recognized as exempt
from the warrant requirement imposed by the fourth amendment. 2
Two rationales traditionally have been offered to justify this exemp-
tion: protection of the arresting officer from weapons concealed on
the arrestee and the preservation of criminal evidence which the ar-
restee might seek to destroy. Last Term, however, the Supreme Court
decided in two companion cases that an officer's power to conduct a
personal search incident to a custodial arrest is absolute and not re-
stricted to these rationales.
Defendant Robinson was stopped by a District of Columbia police
officer for driving an automobile after revocation of his operator's
permit and for obtaining a substitute permit by false representation.
Robinson was placed in custody, advised of his rights and frisked by
the arresting officer. During the frisk, the officer felt a bulge in Robin-
son's overcoat pocket; he reached into the pocket and removed a
crumpled cigarette package containing small round objects. The of-
I. See T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 44-45 (1969),
cited in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 233 n.3 (1973). As the Robinson
Court noted:
Taylor suggests that there is "little reason to doubt that search of an arrestee's
person and premises is as old as the institution of arrest itself." Id. at 28. "Neither
in the reported cases nor the legal literature is there any indication that search of
the person of an arrestee, or the premises in which he was taken, was ever chal-
lenged in England until the end of the nineteenth century ... [and] the English
courts gave the point short shrift." Id. at 29.
414 U.S. at 233 n.3.
2. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914); Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925). There are other exceptions to the warrant requirement. The
first is a warrantless search of motor vehicles based upon probable cause to believe
they are transporting contraband or criminal evidence. Originally developed during
prohibition era to allow authorities to stop vehicles carrying illegal liquor,.it has re-
mained as a valid exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. See
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 458-60 '(1971); Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). See also
State v. Lehman, 8 Wn. App. 408, 506 P.2d 1316 (1973). The second is a warrantless
search because the defendant has consented to the search. See In re McNear v. Rhay,
65 Wn. 2d 530, 398 P.2d 732 (1965). For less common exceptions see C. ANTIEAU,
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.12 (1969); J. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
THE ACCUSED: PRE-TRIAL RIGHTS § 49 (1972).
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ficer opened the package and discovered gelatin capsules, later found
to contain heroin. At trial for possession of heroin, the capsules were
introduced into evidence over the objection that they were the fruit of
an illegal search; Robinson was convicted. 3 The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, en banc, reversed the conviction,
holding that the search of Robinson's person had violated the fourth
amendment. 4
Defendant Gustafson was stopped by Florida police for weaving
across the median stripe. Unable to produce his driver's license, Gus-
tafson was arrested for driving without a valid operator's license and
taken into custody. Before placing him in the squad car, the arresting
officer conducted a frisk of Gustafson's clothing but detected no suspi-
cious objects. Upon completing the pat-down, the officer placed his
hand in Gustafson's coat pocket, extracted a Benson and Hedges ciga-
rette box, opened the box and found marijuana cigarettes. At trial,
the marijuana was introduced into evidence over Gustafson's objec-
tion that the intensity of the search had violated the fourth amend-
ment; Gustafson was convicted. The Supreme Court of Florida
affirmed the conviction.5
In United States v. Robinson6 and Gustafson v. Florida,7 the Su-
preme Court reversed the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and
affirmed the Florida Supreme Court, upholding in each case the va-
lidity of the search. This note will analyze the doctrinal consistency of
these decisions with prior law of search and seizure incident to arrest.
An evaluation of the Court's rationale for its holdings also will be at-
tempted, although the total absence of any discernable justification for
3. Robinson was convicted of the possession and facilitation of concealment of
heroin in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) (1964) & 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964).
4. 471 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The court of appeals held that in a search
incident to a traffic arrest, where there is no evidence of the offense to be preserved.
the most intrusive search the Constitution will allow is a limited frisk for weapons.
and even then only when the officer reasonably believes himself to be in danger. The
court analogized the Robinson arrest to an investigative stop and held that in each
case a search of the person must be no greater than necessary to uncover concealed
weapons.
5. Gustafson was convicted at the trial court level for possession of marijuana.
The Court of Appeal for the Fourth District of Florida reversed Gustafson's convic-
tion, holding that the search had violated the fourth and fourteenth amendments.
Gustafson v. State, 243 So. 2d 615 (Ct. App. Fla. 1971). The Supreme Court of
Florida reversed that decision, affirming the original conviction, State v. Gustafson.
258 So. 2d I (Fla. 1972).
6. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
7. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
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expanding searches incident to arrest in either majority opinion makes
such an evaluation difficult. The Court's holdings, nonetheless, are
clear; a plausible justification for them will be suggested. Finally, this
note will attempt to predict the future impact of Robinson and Gus-
tafson on related search incident to arrest situations.
I. THE HOLDING
In both Robinson and Gustafson, the defendant was searched fol-
lowing an arrest for a "traffic" offense, a crime which does not inher-
ently involve armed violence or evidence which can be concealed on
the driver. Both defendants argued that while a weapons frisk may
have been necessary as a precautionary measure during the traffic ar-
rest, an officer who detects no suspicious objects during the frisk
should not be permitted to rummage through the driver's pockets in
exploratory fashion.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority of six in Robinson, re-
jected what he considered unnecessary restrictions on the authority to
search arrested persons. Reviewing the decisional law on search inci-
dent to arrest, from Pollock and Maitland to the present, the majority
found no support for the contention that at least one of the two tradi-
tional rationales for the authority to search a person incident to arrest
must be present to justify a search in each case.8 A police officer's de-
cision to search an arrestee is "necessarily a quick ad-hoc judgment;" 9
its constitutionality should not depend, Justice Rehnquist asserted, on
what a court may later decide was the probability that weapons or
evidence would be found on the suspect. A search incident to a lawful
custodial arrest is "reasonable" per se under the fourth amendment,
the Court held, and an arresting officer is entitled during the course of
the search to inspect any item found on the arrestee; any contraband
or evidence of an unrelated criminal offense may be seized. 10
Justice Stewart, concurring in Gustafson, approved a full search
incident to arrest, but suggested that the fourth and fourteenth amend-
ments may be violated by a full custodial arrest for a minor traffic of-
fense.11 Justice Powell, concurring in both Robinson and Gustafson,
8. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
9. Id.
10. Id.at236.
11. Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 266-67.
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viewed the fourth amendment from a privacy perspective. He rea-
soned that because the constitutional guarantee of privacy is abated
by the fact of arrest, an individual under custodial arrest retains no
significant fourth amendment protection for the privacy of his person.' 2
Justice Marshall, writing for the dissent in both cases, 13 strongly
criticized the majority's categorical approval of full searches incident
to arrest. Characterizing the majority's holding as an ill-advised de-
parture from the traditional notion that courts must adjudicate rea-
sonableness on a case by case basis, the dissent argued that the fourth
amendment requires that police conduct "be subjected to the more
detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasona-
bleness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular cir-
cumstances."' 4 Attention to the details of arrest and search is neces-
sary, the dissent continued, in order to determine first whether the ar-
rest was effected for legitimate reasons rather than merely as a pretext
to search the arrestee, and second whether the method of search was
reasonable under the circumstances.' 5 Since a search incident to arrest
has the sole objectives of uncovering weapons and preserving evidence
of crime, the dissent would have limited the scope of the search ac-
cordingly. If, as in most traffic arrests, there is no evidence of crime to
be preserved, a search will be reasonable only if made to uncover
concealed weapons. The dissent therefore concluded that while the
arresting officers in Robinson and Gustafson were justified in con-
ducting a self-protective frisk of the prisoner, they were not justified in
opening the cigarette packages unless they reasonably believed them
to contain weapons.' 6
II. SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST AS AN EXCEPTION TO
THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
Robinson and Gustafson are the first Supreme Court opinions to
consider whether a traffic arrestee may always be fully searched. In
these two opinions, the Court has expanded the exemption from war-
12. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 237-38.
13. Justices Douglas and Brennanjoined in Justice Marshall's dissent.
14. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 21 (1968), quoted in Robinson, 414 U.S. at 239.
15. The majority opinion noted that no claim of a pretext arrest was presented in
Robinson and left "for another day questions which would arise on facts different
from these." Robinson, 414 U.S. at 221 n.l.
16. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 255-56.
1126
Vol. 49: 1123, 1974
Search Incident to Custodial Arrest
rant requirements for searches incident to arrest from a narrow privi-
lege, limited by protectionary and evidentiary objectives, to one that is
virtually unlimited.
A. Background: A Standard of Reasonableness
In 1925, in Agnello v. United States,'7 the Court outlined in broad
fashion the right of police to conduct warrantless searches incident to
arrest, stating that a search of the person arrested and the place'of
arrest is permitted "in order to find and seize things connected with
the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as
well as weapons and other things to effect an escape from custody .... ,,18
Applying Agnello in Marron v. United States,19 the Court af-
firmed a conviction for illegal sale of liquor based upon business
ledgers seized at the time and place of the defendant's arrest, because
the ledgers were related to the crime for which the arrest was made
and were subject to later destruction by the defendant if not immedi-
ately seized. While reiterating in subsequent cases the general au-
thority to search the person and place incident to arrest, the Court has
stressed that the privilege to search is to be strictly construed. 20 Courts
were to judge the reasonableness of a particular search in light of the
"inherent necessities" 2 ' existing at the time of arrest and to adjudicate
reasonableness on a case by case basis.22
17. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
18. Id. at 30.
19. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
20. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464-65 (1932). In Lefkowvitz, the
Court reversed a conviction for illegal sale of liquor on the grounds that search of ar-
rest premises was too general and exploratory. The arrest, though lawful, did not
justify a ransacking of the premises for evidence of the crime. See also Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344 (193 1).
21. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 708 (1948), quoted in note 64 infra.
See also Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1930). A search will be
valid only if the arrest was made with a proper warrant or the arresting officers pos-
sessed probable cause to arrest. In Go-Bart, prohibition agents, acting under color of
an invalid arrest warrant and falsely claiming to have a search warrant, entered the
company's office, placed two employees under arrest and made a general search of the
premises which revealed records used to convict the defendants.
22. Go-Bart v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1930): "There is no formula for
the determination of reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own facts and
circumstances." Accord, Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947) (5-4 de-
cision) (police may seize evidence of crimes not related to the crime for which the
defendant is arrested even though not in plain view).
1127
Washington Law Review Vol. 49: 1123, 1974
In decisions subsequent to Agnello and Marron, the Court devel-
oped specific standards by which lower courts may judge the reasona-
bleness of incident searches. The arrest must be lawful and based
upon probable cause. 23 It must not be a mere pretext to search.2 4 The
search must be contemporaneous with the arrest. 25 Finally, the search
of the arrest vicinity must be confined to that area within the arrestee's
immediate control. 26
As the Robinson majority emphasized, however, these standards
have not included any requirement that, before the search can be initi-
ated, exigent circumstances must indicate a need to search. While
some lower courts have taken the view that an officer may not con-
duct a full search following an arrest for a minor, nonviolent offense,27
the Supreme Court has never specifically required that reasonable-
ness of an arrest search be gauged from the seriousness of the crime.
23. Rios v. United Sates. 364 U.S. 253, 261-62 (1960) (courts must pay par-
ticular attention to the sequence of events surrounding the arrest and search to de-
termine if there was sufficient probable cause to arrest; an arrest may not be justified
by what a later search reveals). "[A] search is not to be made legal by what it turns
up. In law it is good or bad when it starts and does not change character from its
success." United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948) (footnote omitted).
24. "An arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence." United
States v. Lefkowitz, 385 U.S. 452, 467 (1932) (discussed in note 20 supra): Jones v.
United States, 357 U.S. 493, 500 (1958) (federal officers' purpose in entering prem-
ises was to search for illegal distilling equipment, and not to arrest the defendant):
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (administrative arrest warrant for de-
portation proceedings may not be misused to search for criminal evidence).
25. United States v. Edwards. 94 S. Ct. 1234 (1974) (once an accused has
been lawfully arrested and is in custody, the effects in his personal possession at
the place of detention that were subject to search at the time and place of arrest may
be searched and seized lawfully without a warrant even after a substantial time lapse
-twelve hours-between book-in and search); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364
(1964) (car towed to police station and searched there "soon after" driver's book-
ing for vagrancy was unreasonable search because too remote in time and place from
arrest): Stoner v. California. 376 U.S. 483 (1964): (warrantless search of hotel
room for evidence of robbery which occurred two days prior to arrest held un-
reasonable).
26. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
27. In light of the rationale developed to permit a warrantless search incident to
arrest, and because traffic arrests do not normally involve a risk of violence, courts
have been reluctant to uphold searches of traffic violators unless it could be shown
that the arresting officer reasonably believed the driver to be armed. Since in the ma-
jority of traffic arrests there is no tangible evidence, other than perhaps the driver's
license, to be preserved, a search of the driver would be reasonable only if made for
self-protection.
In People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98, 228 N.E.2d 783, 281 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1967). the
defendant was arrested pursuant to a warrant for a speeding violation. Incident to the
arrest, police searched the arrestee, taking from his pocket a book of matches found
to contain evidence implicating him in a gambling ring. In reversing Marsh's con-
viction for gambling, the New York Court of Appeals held that an arrest for a traffic
1128
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B. Scope Limitations for Search Incident to Arrest: Place of Arrest
In its quest for a standard of reasonableness for arrest searches, the
Court has faced the problem of defining the permissible scope of such
searches. How widely or intrusively may police search and what may
they seize?
In Chimel v. California,28 the Court defined the spatial scope of a
permissible search. Police officers, after arresting the accused in his
home for burglary of a coin shop, had conducted a warrantless search
of his entire house, including attic and garage. Rejecting the prosecu-
tion's argument that the search was valid because conducted incident
to arrest, the Court limited the scope of an incident search to the area
within the immediate control of the arrestee. The Court defined the
area within the arrestee's control as that area into which the arrestee
might reach for a weapon or evidence of the crime.29
offense does not provide police with the authority to search "unless the officer has
reason to fear an assault or probable cause for believing that his prisoner has com-
mitted a crime." Id. at 786.
Simlarly, in People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 7 Cal.3d 186, 496
P.2d 1205, 1210-1214, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837, 842-46 (1972), the California Supreme
Court held that marijuana seized during the search of a traffic arrestee could not be
used as evidence. The California court concluded that the state has the burden of
demonstrating the reasonableness of a search incident to arrest, a necessary element
of which is either a belief that the arrestee was armed or else concealing destructible
evidence. In Washington, the state has also been given the burden of "showing that
the urgency of the situation made the chosen course imperative and permitted a
search without a warrant within one of the exceptions." State v. Smith, 9 Wn. App.
309, 313, 511 P.2d 1390, 1393, citing State v. Sanders, 8 Wn. App. 306, 506 P.2d 892(1973) (additional citation omitted).
The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Humphrey, 409 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir. 1969),
held that the driver of an automobile stopped for running a red light might be
searched only if the circumstances attending the stop gave the officers probable cause
to believe that the driver had committed a crime more serious than the traffic offense.
In Humphrey the court stated:
We are in complete agreement with the prevailing federal and state authority
which condemns the search of persons and automobiles following routine traffic
violations. Such searches can only be justified in exceptional, on the spot circum-
stances which rise to the dignity of probable cause.
Id. at 1058. See also United States v. Reid, 415 F.2d 294 (10th Cir. 1969).
Even those courts which have consistently affirmed the legality of searches of drivers
incident to traffic arrests have felt obliged to find that the officer was faced with
threatening circumstances, no matter how slight. Thus, in Mitchell v. State, 482
S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals upheld a
conviction for possession of marijuana found during the search of a driver stopped
for running a red light. In its opinion the court stressed that because of the driver's
hostile and abusive language toward the officer, a search of the driver for weapons
was a reasonable, self-protective measure.
28. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
29. Id. at 763.
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While the Chimel limitation applied only to a search of the vicinity
of the arrest, and not to a search of the person of the arrestee, it
clearly was derived from the original rationales for a warrantless
search incident to arrest. 30 If the justification for a search is grounded
on a need to disarm the arrestee and to prevent the destruction of evi-
dence of the crime, then the search must be no broader than is neces-
sary to accomplish these two objectives. 3' Chimel likewise is con-
sistent with judicial statements that an arrest should not provide police
with a broader power to search than would a search warrant specifi-
cally describing the place to be searched and the thing to be seized.
3 2
C. Scope Limitations for Searches of the Person: The Dissent's
Position
The crucial issue in Robinson and Gustafson was not whether an
officer has authority to search a traffic arrestee but whether he may
conduct a full search of the person of the arrestee. Stated simply,
should scope limitations similar to those applied to searches of the
area surrounding the arrestee be applied to searches of the arrestee's
person? In Robinson and Gustafson this inquiry was directed specifi-
cally at determining first whether the officers acted reasonably in re-
moving the cigarette packages from the defendants' pockets and
second whether their inspections of the contents of the packages were
reasonable.
The issue raised by the officers' removal of the cigarette packages
can properly be understood only in light of the stop and frisk doctrine
of Terry v. Ohio.33 In Terry, a plainclothes detective observed suspi-
30. Id. at 762-63.
3 1. There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching any
room other than that in which an arrest occurs-or, for that matter, for search-
ing through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room
itself.
Id. at 763.
32. Id. at 767. Police should not be allowed to arrange to arrest a suspect at home
rather than elsewhere in order to search the home. Chimel quotes with approval Judge
Learned Hand's dictum in United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2nd Cir.
1926):
After arresting a man in his house, to rummage at will among his papers in
search of whatever will convict him. appears to us to be indistinguishable from
what might be done under a general warrant .... True, by hypothesis the power
would not exist, if the supposed offender were not found on the premises: but it
is small consolation to know that one's papers are safe only so long as one is not
at home.
33. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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cious behavior on the part of three men. Believing the men to be
"casing a job, a stick-up," the officer approached the men, identified
himself as a police officer and asked for their names.34 His suspicions
not allayed by their mumbled responses, the officer spun one of them,
Terry, around and patted down his outer clothing. Detecting a hard
object, the officer removed a revolver from the overcoat pocket of the
defendant. At trial, the gun was introduced into evidence over Terry's
objection that the search had violated the fourth amendment; he was
subsequently convicted.
Although Terry had not been under arrest at the time of the search,
and consequently the search could not be justified as incident to ar-
rest, the Court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that the officer had
engaged in a limited weapons frisk for his own protection. Chief Jus-
tice Warren, writing for a majority of eight, held that when an officer
investigates suspicious behavior with less than probable cause to ar-
rest, and he reasonably believes a suspect to be armed and dangerous,
the officer may frisk for weapons. Only if the officer feels what he be-
lieves to be a weapon during this pat-down may he reach beneath the
outer garments and retrieve the object.35
Terry emphasized that while an investigative stop is a lesser intru-
sion upon the individual's freedom of movement than is an arrest, it
remains a seizure of the person under the fourth amendment.3 6 As
such, to be justified any contemporaneous search of the person must
be reasonable. Since the officer in Terry lacked probable cause to ar-
rest, the Court concluded that a search under those circumstances
could be justified only if made for a legitimate governmental interest.37
The Court found a sufficient governmental interest in the protection
of police officers during investigation of suspicious activity, but stipu-
lated that the scope of the search must be confined to that objective. 38
34. Id. at 6-7.
35. Id. at 30.
36. It is quite plain that the fourth amendment governs "seizures" of the per-
son which do not eventuate in a trip to the stationhouse and prosecution for
crime----"arrests" in traditional terminology. It must be recognized that whenever
a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he
has "seized" that person.
Id. at 16.
37. Id.at2O-21.
38. And in determining whether the seizure and search were "unreasonable" our
inquiry is a dual one-whether the officer's action was justified at its inception,
and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justi-




In a companion case to Terry, Peters v. New York, 39 the Court
appeared to apply Terry's objective scope limitations to an actual ar-
rest search. In Peters, an off-duty police officer surprised two men in
what he suspected to be an act of burglary. The officer chased and
caught one of them, Peters, and when Peters was unable to explain
satisfactorily his presence in the building, the officer frisked him for
weapons. Feeling what he thought could be a knife, the officer
reached inside Peter's overcoat and removed a long cylinder which
was found to contain burglary tools. Peters was convicted of posses-
sion of burglary tools.
Although the Court determined that the officer had probable cause
to arrest Peters at the moment he seized him, the Court inquired into
whether the scope of the search had been reasonable. Concluding that
the officer first frisked Peters for weapons and removed only that ob-
ject which he thought to be a weapon, the Court approved the search
as "reasonably limited in scope by these purposes." 4 0 The officer did
not, the Court stated, "engage in an unrestrained and thorough going
examination of Peters and his personal effects." 41
Relying on Terry, the dissent in Robinson concluded that since
both a frisk incident to an investigative stop and a search incident to a
traffic arrest are defensive in purpose, no distinction between scope
limitations in the two contexts should be made.42 Justice Marshall as-
serted that in neither Robinson nor Gustafson had the removal and
inspection of the cigarette package been motivated by a defensive
purpose.4 3 In Robinson, the officer had testified that he had extracted
the object not because it felt like a weapon but because police regula-
tions instructed an officer to examine all the contents of the arrestee's
39. 392 U.S. 40 (1968). (Peters was decided together with Sibron v. New York.)
40. Id. at 67.
41. Id. This language from Peters was cited with approval in Chimel, 395 U.S. at
764.
42. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 252-55 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent would
not strictly confine all traffic arrest searches to Terry standards, but would allow for
more intrusion if necessary in light of particular circumstances, as where "a suspect
taken into custody may feel more threatened by the serious restraint on his liberty
than a person who is simply stopped by an officer for questioning, and may therefore
be more likely to resort to force." Id. at 254.
43. The dissent argued that once the officer had the cigarette package in his pos-
session there was no further risk that the arrestee might extract a weapon from it and
that opening the package did not further the protective purpose of the search. Id. at
255-56.
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pockets. 44 In Gustafson, the officer had already conducted a thorough
frisk of the arrestee and had detected no suspicious objects at the time
he reached into the coat pocket and removed the cigarette package.
Even if the officers had properly removed the objects believing them
to be weapons, the dissent argued, the officers were foreclosed from
inspecting their contents. 45
III. THE MAJORITY'S RATIONALE: CUSTODIAL ARREST IS
ENOUGH TO JUSTIFY A FULL SEARCH OF THE
PERSON BECAUSE...?
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion is divided analytically into
four parts. In part I of the opinion, Justice Rehnquist briefly exam-
ined the tangentially relevant Supreme Court decisions of the past 60
years, drawing two conclusions. First,46
the broadly stated rule ["that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a
traditional exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment" 47] and the reasons for it have been repeatedly affirmed
in the decisions of this Court since Weeks v. United States ... nearly
sixty years ago.
Second, these decisions "clearly imply that such searches also meet the
Fourth Amendment's requirement of reasonableness. 48 In part II of
the opinion Justice Rehnquist attempted to distinguish Terry v. Ohio
and, to a lesser extent, related scope limitation cases. Part III of the
opinion explored the intent of the framers of the fourth amendment;
Justice Rehnquist acknowledged for the first time in this section that
"[v] irtually all of the statements of this Court affirming the exist-
ence of an unqualified authority to search incident to a lawful arrest
44. In conducting a full field search, "even though [the officer] may feel some-
thing that he believes is not a weapon, he is instructed to take it out." . . . The
officer is taught to examine everything he has on him at the field search. Every-
thing that we find in his pockets is examined to find out what exactly it is.
United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (citation omitted).
45. The dissent also argued that it would have been improper to open the cig-
arette package during an inventory search at the police station. Robinson, 414 U.S. at
258 n.7 (Marshall, Douglas & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
46. 414 U.S. at 226.
47. ld. at 224.
48. Id. at 226.
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are dicta. '49 Then, in an unavailing attempt to buttress six decades
of dicta, the majority opinion quoted at length from a century-old
New Hampshire case50 and reviewed well-known treatises.5' Part IV
of the majority opinion merely stated the holding.
Justice Rehnquist apparently intended to establish in part I that a
full search of the person incident to a custodial arrest is traditional
fourth amendment doctrine, but was relying upon opinion language
which he later admitted to be only dicta. Part II is entirely defensive,
an attempt to evade the Warren Court decisions imposing scope
limitations on searches incident to a stop-and-frisk or to an arrest.
Continuing this defensive posture in part III, Justice Rehnquist
sought to shore up the conclusions reached in part I with very old
lower court precedent while completely ignoring the far greater rele-
vancy of more recent state court decisions.5 2 The end result is that
only the holding in Robinson is clear; the rationale supporting the
holding is undermined even by the majority opinion itself.
A. Arrest Distinguished from Stop
The Robinson majority rejected the application of Terry to arrest
searches on two grounds: first, for the practical reason that a frisk is
inadequate protection for an arresting officer, and second, because of
the factual distinction that Terry did not involve a full arrest. The
Robinson Court viewed the frisk limitations of Terry as devised exclu-
sively for nonarrest encounters. While a stop may be relatively brief,
the Court pointed out, a custodial arrest considerably prolongs the
officer's contact with the accused. It is this danger of continued expo-
sure which provides the "basis for treating all custodial arrests alike
49. Id. at 230.
50. Id. at 23 1, quoting Closson v. Morrison. 47 N.H. 482 (1867).
51. Justice Marshall. in dissent, questioned the utility of this historical inquiry:
One need not go back to Blackstone's Commentaries. Holmes' Common Law.
or Pollock & Maitland [all referred to in the majority opinion] in search of pre-
cedent for the approach adopted by the Court of Appeals. Indeed, given the fact
that mass production of the automobile did not begin until the early decades of
the present century, I find it somewhat puzzling that the majority even looks to
these sources on the only question presented in this case: the permissible scope of
a search of the person incident to a lawful arrest for violation of a motor vehicle
regulation.
414 U.S. at 244.
52. See cases discussed in Robinson, 414 U.S. at 242 48 (Marshall. J.. dissenting).
See al.o cases discussed in note 27 %u/pra.
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for purposes of search justification. '53 This continued exposure may
provide the arrestee ample time to produce a weapon not discovered
by a cursory frisk.
The distinction between a Terry-type stop and a full arrest is clearly
discernible, the majority stressed, when one contrasts their respective
legal consequences. An arrest, unlike a stop, is the initial stage of a
criminal prosecution and "is inevitably accompanied by future inter-
ference with the individual's freedom of movement . . . ."54 By "sub-
jecting the body of the accused to its physical dominion, '55 the law
assumes a control over the individual which necessarily diminishes
fourth amendment protections. Justice Rehnquist repeatedly empha-
sized that it is the fact of custodial arrest which establishes the au-
thority to search, without explaining why it should have this effect. If
the permitted scope of a search incident to arrest is always greater
than that of an investigative stop, the power to search varies with the
degree to which police have seized the person; because an arrest in-
volves a greater exertion of state authority over the individual than
does a stop, the arrest carries with it a greater authority to search. The
police need not show a necessity for a full search of the arrestee; the
power to search is, under Robinson, a consequence of arrest.
According to the majority opinion in Robinson, the exception to
fourth amendment protection for searches incident to arrest tradition-
ally has been divided into two distinct analytical categories: search of
53. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
The danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its atten-
dant proximity, stress and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest. One
study concludes that approximately 30% of the shootings of police officers occur
when an officer stops a person in an automobile. Bristow, Police Officer Shootings
-A Tactical Evaluation, 54J. CRI m. L.C. & P.S. 93 (1963).
414 U.S. at 234 n.5.
54. 414 U.S. at 228, quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 25-26:
IA] n arrest is a wholly different kind of intrusion upon individual freedom from
a limited search for weapons, and the interests each is designed to serve are like-
wise quite different. An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution. It is
intended to vindicate society's interest in having its laws obeyed, and it is in-
evitably accompanied by future interference with the individual's freedom of
movement, whether or not trial or conviction ultimately follows.
Compare Chimel, 395 U.S. at 767 n.12:
And we can see no reason why, simply because some interference with an in-
dividual's privacy and freedom of movement has lawfully taken place, further
intrusions should automatically be allowed despite the absence of a warrant that
the Fourth Amendment would otherwise require.
55. 414 U.S. at 232, quoting Chief Justice Cardozo in People v. Chiagles, 237 N.Y.
193, 197, 142 N.E. 583, 584 (1923).
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the arrestee's person and search of the arrest area. 56 While the Court
has dealt repeatedly with the constitutionality and permissible scope
of area searches, Justice Rehnquist alleged that prior to Robinson no
case had questioned the legality of searches of arrestees.57 Scope limi-
tations and other criteria for reasonableness were developed to govern
police conduct in searching arrest premises and therefore have no
bearing on personal searches of arrested persons. Justice Rehnquist
summarily refused to read language in Peters as imposing constraints
on searches of an arrestee's personal effects,58 claiming that to do so
would impose a "novel and far reaching limitation on the authority to
search the person of an arrestee incident to his lawful arrest." 59
B. Custody and Privacy
The Robinson Court's authorization of a full personal search fol-
lowing any custodial arrest may be attributable in part to the very
56. 414 U.S. at 224.
57. Id. at 225. Justice Rehnquist did not mention Peters v. New York. 392 U.S.
40 (1968). see text accompanying notes 39-41 supra, which imposed a scope limita-
tion on the search of a person already arrested "for purposes of constitutional justi-
fication." 392 U.S. at 67. See quotation in note 58 infra.
58. "Moreover, [the search] was reasonably limited in scope by these purposes.
Officer Lasky did not engage in an unrestrained and thorough-going examination of
Peters and his personal effects." Robinson, 414 U.S. at 229 quoting Peters, 392 U.S.
at 67. Justice Harlan. concurring in Peters, wrote that he believed the second sentence
above was not intended to impose scope limitations on an arrest search. but was
"merely a factual observation," 392 U.S. at 77 (Harlan, J.. concurring) (footnote
omitted). quoted in Robinson, 414 U.S. at 229. Justice Douglas. also concurring in
Peters, 392 U.S. at 69, reasoned that the arresting officer could "conduct a limited
search of his person for weapons."
Relying on Justice Harlan's concurring opinion, and without mentioning the other
four concurring opinions, Justice Rehnquist completely ignored the second sentence
quoted from Peters, above, and summarily dismissed the remaining sentence with his
"novel limitation" language. See discussion at note 59 infra.
59. 414 U.S. at 229. Justice Rehnquist's "novel limitation" terminology is highly
questionable even on the basis of authority quoted in the Robinson opinion. See id. at
232, quoting from People v. Chiagles. 237 N.Y. 193, 197, 142 N.E. 583, 584 (1923).
wherein Chief Justice Cardozo imposed scope limitations 50 years before Robinson:
"[T] he search being lawful, he retains what he finds if connected with the crime."
(emphasis added) See also 414 U.S. at 225, quoting from Agnello v. United States.
269 U.S. 20. 30 (1925). decided 48 years before Robinson:
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons lawfully
arrested while committing crime and to search the place where the arrest is made
in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the
means by which it was committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect
an escape from custody, is not to be doubted.
(emphasis added). Agnello clearly imposed the two traditional scope limitations-
self-protection and preservation of evidence-in 1925.
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nature of custody itself. A person in custody is afforded fourth amend-
ment protections only marginally greater than those afforded peniten-
tiary inmates, even though his guilt has yet to be established. A traffic
offender who is lodged in jail to await posting of bond may be sub-
jected to shake-down searches, solitary confinement and other rigors
of prison life. Lower courts have consistently upheld the constitu-
tionality of such treatment, stressing that it is the prisoner's status qua
prisoner which restricts his fourth amendment protections.60
The assumption that constitutional privilege may be affected by an
individual's custodial status has played a major role in prior Court
decisions. Thus, in Miranda v. Arizona,61 which established the right
to remain silent and have counsel present during custodial interroga-
tion, the Court held that the fifth amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination requires extraordinary procedural safeguards when-
ever police question an individual "in custody"; otherwise, the volun-
tary nature of the confession or communication is suspect. Whereas
Miranda perceived custody as a status demanding added protection
for fifth amendment rights, Robinson views custody as the threshold
beyond which fourth amendment protections wane.
In Katz v. United States,6 2 involving warrantless wiretaps, the
Court departed from the traditional concept that the fourth amend-
ment protected only persons and property from physical trespass;
fourth amendment protections must be observed, Katz concluded,
60. A jail inmate may not invoke the fourth amendment's warrant requirement to
prevent guards from reading his mail and turning its incriminating evidence over to
prosecutors. Hicks v. State, 480 S.W.2d 357 (Tenn. 1972). See also Salinas v. State,
479 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1972).
California courts have held that because prison authorities may subject those in
custody to surveillance as intense as security requires and because a parolee remains
in the state's constructive custody, parole authorities may search the parolee, his
home and personal effects whenever they deem it advisable. People v. Hernandez,
229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1964), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 930 (1968).
61. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). "To summarize, we hold that when an individual is
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any
significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination
is jeopardized." Id. at 478.
62. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Court held that a wiretap of a public phone booth,,
made without a warrant, is a violation of the fourth amendment's right of privacy
even though there occurred no physical penetration or trespass of a "constitutionally
protected area." In place of the traditional concept that the fourth amendment pro-
tected certain private areas, such as homes and offices, the Court proposed that the
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches extended to public areas and
any activity in which a person held a "reasonable expectation of privacy." See id. at
362 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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whenever and wherever an individual has a "reasonable expectation
of privacy." The reasonableness of such an expectation by a person
held in custody might well be questioned. Acceptance of an interpreta-
tion of the fourth amendment as providing constitutional protection
for privacy expectations would offer an analytical justification for the
lesser protection afforded persons in custody. The majority, however,
relied less upon this reasoning than did Justice Powell.63
C. The Adequacy of the Majority's Rationale
The Court's justification for distinguishing Terry and for permitting
a full search of an arrestee-the increased danger that supposedly
arises from extended proximity with the arrestee-is less than persua-
sive. Certainly in Terry, where three men appeared to be planning a
daylight robbery, there was far more likelihood that the suspects were
armed and dangerous than was apparent during the arrests of Rob-
inson and Gustafson. If the Supreme Court felt obliged in Terry to
limit and restrict the scope of a search of suspects whose actions posed
a potentially serious danger to the community, it seems incongruous
that during an arrest for a traffic offense entailing little danger the
Court would automatically permit an unlimited search of the arrestee.
Justice Rehnquist offered no authority to support his contention
that the court traditionally has treated searches of the arrestee and
searches of the arrest area as analytically distinct. While it is true that
the Court has dealt most often with factual patterns involving evi-
dence seized from the area around the arrestee, there is no indication
in prior opinions that an individual may always be searched simply
because he is under arrest. On the contrary, in past opinions the Court
has stated expressly that the exemption from the warrant requirement
is for the sake of necessity, 4 to the extent that Robinson relied
63. "1 believe that an individual lawfully subjected to a custodial arrest retains
no significant Fourth Amendment interest in the privacy of his person." Robinson,
414 U.S. at 237 (Powell. J.. concurring). See also Charles v. United States. 278 F.2d
386. 388 (9th Cir. 1960):
To say that the police may curtail the liberty of the accused but refrain from
impinging upon the sanctity of his pockets except for enumerated reasons is to
ignore the custodail duties which devolve upon arresting authorities. Custody
must of necessity be asserted initially over whatever the arrested party has in his
possession at the time of apprehension.
64. A search or seizure without a warrant as an incident to a lawful arrest has
always been considered to be a strictly limited right. It grows out of the inherent
necessities of the situation at the time of the arrest. But there must be something
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on lawful arrest alone as legitimizing a full search of the arrestee,
it is inconsistent with precedent. 65
The weakest element in the Court's analysis is its treatment of the
right of police to inspect items found on the arrestee. Under the
"plain-view" doctrine, police may seize any item of evidence or con-
traband which is discovered inadvertently during the course of a
lawful search.66 The item must be clearly visible, however, and its in-
criminating character "immediately apparent. '67 As enunciated in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire:68
Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only
when it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence
before them; the "plain-view" doctrine may not be used to extend a
general exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges.
Gustafson clearly seems to contradict this rule; the discovery of the
marijuana came only after a purposeful examination of an otherwise
innocent looking cigarette package. Robinson complies better with the
"plain-view" doctrine since the officer detected the suspicious contents
of the cigarette package as he first held the package; he was alerted to
the contraband without an exploratory investigation on his part. In
neither Robinson nor Gustafson did the majority articulate the para-
meters of the "plain-view" doctrine in the context of traffic arrests.
The majority's blanket assertion that police are entitled to inspect
items found on the arrestee could lead, as the dissent recognized, to
obvious abuses.69
more in the way of necessity than merely a lawful arrest. The mere fact that
there is a valid arrest does not ipso facto legalize a search or seizure without a
warrant.
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 708 (1947) (footnote omitted).
65. See 414 U.S. at 242-48 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see note 27 supra.
66. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (197 1).
67. Id. at 466. For an interesting application of the "plain-view" doctrine, see
Nicholas v. State, 502 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973), where arresting officers
who had neither knowledge nor suspicion of an offense related to photographic nega-
tives, made deliberate efforts to examine the negatives, and only then did the officers
become aware that the films might be evidence of a crime. The examination of the neg-
atives violated the "plain-view" rule because the incriminating character of the negatives
was not "immediately apparent."
68. 403 U.S. 443, 466.
69. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 257 (Marshall, J., dissenting):
One wonders if the result in this case would have been the same were respondent
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D. Other Possible Justification
The Court neglected to emphasize the most logical argument sup-
porting full searches of arrested persons-that the individual will be
fully searched at the stationhouse anyway. The inventory or book-in
search, applicable to all arrestees, is a notorious feature of custodial
administration and, according to recent Supreme Court dicta, is a rea-
sonable search under the fourth amendment.7 0 The majority might
have stressed that a search which is legitimate at the jail can be consi-
dered no less legitimate simply because it is conducted at an earlier
state of custody.7' It would seem inconsequential to the arrestee's in-
terests where or when the search is made, and arrest searches would
eliminate the arrestee's opportunity to dispose of incriminating evi-
dence or to produce a dangerous weapon on the way to the station-
house.
IV. THE IMPACT OF ROBINSON
To the extent that Robinson unqualifiedly permits searches of law-
fully arrested persons, it will require courts to dismiss motions to sup-
press which allege only that the search was not for protective or evi-
a businessman who was lawfully taken into custody for driving without a license
and whose wallet was taken from him by police. Would it be reasonable for the
police office, because of the possibility that a razor blade was hidden somewhere
in the wallet, to open it. remove all the contents, and examine each item care-
fully?
70. Edwards v. United States, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 1238 n.6 (1974): His-
torical evidence points to the established and routine custom of permitting ajailer to search the person who is being processed for confinement under his cus-
tody and control. See, e.g., T. Gardner & V. Manian. Principles and Cases of the
Law of Arrest, Search and Seizure 200 (1974), E. Fisher. Search and Seizure 71
(1970). While "a rule of practice must not be allowed . . . to prevail over a con-
stitutional right," Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 313.41 S.Ct. 261, 266.65
L.Ed. 647 (1921), little doubt has ever been expressed about the validity or reason-
ableness of such searches incident to incarceration. T. Taylor, Two Studies in Con-
stitutional Interpretation 50 (1969).
7 1. It would appear that this justification had been urged on the court of appeals.
but not in the Supreme Court. Why the majority did not seize upon this justification is
unclear. The dissent rejected this possible justification, reasoning first that stationhouse
inventory searches are legitimized because of a governmental interest in keeping contra-
band of all types out of jail; because minor offenses are bailable, however, if an ar-
restee will never enter jail, a stationhouse search often may never occur. Second. the
dissent argued that even if an inventory search contemporaneous to booking did occur.
it would have been sufficient simply to remove all of the arrestee's possessions without
examining their contents. Hence, the cigarette package should not have been opened
and examined even at the stationhouse. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 258 n.7.
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dentiary objectives. Because the test for a reasonable search can be
reduced, under Robinson, to a simple determination of the legality of
the arrest, courts must pay particular attention to the circumstances of
the arrest, especially the sequence of events leading to and including
the arrest and search and the possibility of pretext arrests.
A. Custody Must Still Precede the Search
Robinson adheres strictly to the requirement that custodial arrest
must precede the search. As a practical matter, however, the sequence
of arrest and search may be elusive. Although Robinson does not au-
thorize a search retroactively where the officer's decision to effect a
custodial arrest came only after searching a detainee and finding in-
criminating evidence, if probable cause to arrest existed prior to the
search, it is unlikely that the officer's abuse could be established.
Thus, in practice every person stopped for a minor traffic offense
could be fully searched. If the search reveals contraband or other evi-
dence, the officer may assert that the person was under custodial ar-
rest at the time.72 If the search yields nothing, the officer can issue a
citation and allow the driver to proceed. So long as the officer had
probable cause to arrest and the discretion to take the person into cus-
tody, the decision to implement that discretion could well occur subse-
quent to a full search.73
72. However, where the record clearly establishes that the custodial arrest occurred
after the warrantless search of the person or automobile, Robinson reasoning will not
apply. See State v. Shoemaker, II Wn. App. 187, 191, 522 P.2d 203, 205-06 (1974)
(footnote citing Robinson omitted):
The initial contact with the defendants involved a defective taillight. While the
driver was detained to discuss this defect, a custodial arrest was not made prior to
entry of the vehicle. There being no arrest, no search could have been performed
incident to an arrest.
73. Some courts have liberally construed the authority to search and have not re-
quired in every instance that the defendant be under formal arrest at the time of the
search. See United States v. Riggs, 474 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1973).
On the subject of sequential arrests where the accused is under arrest for one of-
fense and police conduct a search which yields evidence of a second offense, it is gen-
erally conceded that it is unnecessary to place the defendant under arrest a second
time. In Adams v. United States, 399 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1968), then Circuit Judge
Burger challenged the concept of what he called "divisible arrest." He stated:
The reason for requiring probable cause for an arrest is to protect against arbitrary
interference with liberty. When the condition of custody already exists, however,
the constitutional requirement of an arrest on probable cause would be totally
superfluous-a sheer ritual serving no legitimate protective function.
Id. at 581 (Burger, J., concurring).
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B. Pretext Arrests
Neither Robinson nor Gustafson considered the issue of pretext
arrests since both defendants conceded the legality of their arrest.74 In
each case the majority noted that a custodial arrest for the particular
traffic offense was not an extraordinary or unusual procedure. 75 Jus-
tice Rehnquist implied, however, that an irregular or contrived cus-
todial arrest is invalid authority for a Robinson-type search.7 6
Because municipal codes often permit custodial arrest for minor
and even trivial offenses, 77 the risk of pretext arrests is heightened. It
is conceivable that in those instances where there is insufficient prob-
able cause to secure a search warrant, police could arrange to arrest a
suspect for violating a leash law or for running a stop sign solely to
invoke Robinson's "unqualified authority" to search the arrestee.
C. The Impact of Robinson on Searches of Motor Vehicles Incident
to the Driver's Arrest
Since the evidence in both Robinson and Gustafson was seized
during a search of the person of the arrestee, the Court was not re-
quired to decide whether a search of an automobile following the
driver's arrest is always permissible. Until this question is answered,
some courts may interpret Robinson strictly as allowing only a search
of the driver.78 Other courts, seeking to uphold the seizure of evidence
74. Justice Stewart. concurring in Gustafson, pointed out that, had the defendant
not conceded the legality of his arrest, a persuasive claim might have been made that
a custodial arrest for a minor traffic offense violates the fourth and fourteenth amend-
ments. Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 266.
In State v. Shoemaker, the Washington Court of Appeals stated in dictum that an
arrest for a defective tail light would not justify a search of the vehicle, noting: "The
evidence of the crime, defective equipment, was in plain sight and no entry of the ve-
hicle was justified." I I Wn. App. 187. 192, 522 P.2d 203. 206 (1974).
75. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 223 n.2, Gustafyon, 414 U.S. at 265 n.3.
76. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 221 n.l.
77. See SEATTLE, WASH.. CODE § 21.70.140 (1958). which provides that violations
of the traffic code such as speeding, overtime parking, running a stop sign. hauling
manure in the business district, standing in truck loading zones, and embracing another
while driving are punishable by fine and/or imprisonment (not to exceed $500 or six
months or both). Id. § 12.02.060 provides that a police officer may arrest a person
without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has vio-
lated an ordinance in the officer's presence, or not in his presence if the violation in-
volved bodily harm or property damage or the threat of either and the officer reason-
ably believed that immediate arrest was necessary to prevent escape or further injury.
78. See State v. Shoemaker, I I Wn. App. 187. 522 P.2d 203 ( 1974): see discus-
sion at notes 72 & 74 supra.
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from an automobile, may cite Chimel's authorization of a search of
the area within the arrestee's control as validating a search of the ve-
hicle.
Those Court cases dealing with evidence taken from an automobile
following the driver's arrest have fallen into two categories. The first
category encompasses vehicle searches involving probable cause to
believe that the vehicle contains contraband or criminal evidence.79
The second category covers noninvestigative searches made to inven-
tory the contents of impounded vehicles.8 0
Because of the mobility of motor vehicles and the fact that they can
be quickly moved out of the jurisdiction in which police must seek a
warrant, the Court has recognized that police may stop a vehicle and
conduct a warrantless search if there is probable cause to believe the
contents of the vehicle "offend against the law."81 If probable cause
exists to search at the moment the stop is made, police may search for
criminal material at that time or later when the vehicle is impounded. 82
79. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160 (1949); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967). See also People v. Superior
Court of Yolo County, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 478 P.2d 449, 91 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1970), in
which the California court upheld the search of an automobile stopped for a traffic
offense on the grounds that police possessed probable cause to search. The driver's
furtive gestures coupled with prior reliable information constituted valid probable cause
to search. The California court quoted Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959),
on the necessity of probable cause: "[Carroll] merely relaxed the requirements for a
warrant on the grounds of practicability. It did not dispense with the need for probable
cause."
80. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg.
Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968). In Washington, courts have allowed the introduction into
evidence of items inadvertently discovered during inventory searches of lawfully im-
pounded vehicles. State v. Montague, 73 Wn. 2d 381, 438 P.2d 571 (1968); State v.
Olsen, 43 Wn. 2d 726, 263 P.2d 824 (1953); State v. Patterson, 8 Wn. App. 177, 504
P.2d 1197 (1973); State v. Jones, 2 Wn. App. 627, 472 P.2d 402 (1970). The im-
poundment must, however, be authorized by. statute. WAsH. REV. CODE § 4.32.060; id.
§ 46.52.110; id. § 46.61.565; id. § 69.50.505(4) (1963). In the absence of statutory
authority there must be reasonable cause for the impoundment and the state has the
burden of proving such. See State v. Singleton, 9 Wn. App. 327, 511 P.2d 1396 (1973).
8 1. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132, 159 (1925).
82. In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970), the Court held that if prob-
able cause to search existed prior to impoundment then it continues after impoundment
and authorizes the warrantless search of the vehicle, even though the exigent circum-
stances no longer compel an immediate search. Compare Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 462 (1971), in which the Court implied through dicta that a warrant-
less search of a vehicle must be premised on exigent circumstances and necessities.
Coolidge referred to Carroll as permitting searches of impounded vehicles only if there
was probable cause to search at the time of the driver's arrest or the seizure of the
vehicle.
In Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), police arrested the defendant for a
narcotics violation and seized his automobile as required by state law for forfeiture
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The vehicle may be stopped and searched regardless of whether the
driver is to be arrested. Since it is the ambulatory nature of vehicles
and the element of probable cause to search which calls for exemption
from the warrant requirement, these decisions do not support inter-
preting Robinson as allowing a vehicle search based solely upon the
driver's arrest for a traffic violation. 83
The analysis is different, however, where the search of the driver
reveals evidence that the vehicle may contain contraband. Does the
discovery of narcotics on the driver, for example, give probable cause
to believe that the vehicle is transporting narcotics, and therefore
permit a search of the vehicle? Under Chimel, the discovery of contra-
band or criminal evidence on the driver may provide police with au-
thority to search the vehicle since it is within the arrestee's control and
may contain destructible evidence of the crime. A Chimel vehicle
search, based on fruits of a Robinson personal search, could be made
without need to show that probable cause existed before the stop. If,
on the other hand, the search of the driver uncovers no criminal mate-
rial, an investigative search of the vehicle would be unreasonable un-
less made to prevent the arrestee from securing a weapon.
If the driver is arrested and police legally take custody of the ve-
hicle then police may conduct an inventory search of the vehicle in
order to safeguard its contents. While this search is not investigative in
nature, police may seize any criminal material which is inadvertently
discovered during the search. Robinson should have no impact on the
legality of inventory searches of impounded vehicles.
proceedings. The impounded vehicle was searched without a warrant one week after
the defendant's arrest. Although the search was not contemporaneous with the arrest.
the Court approved the search because the seizure of the vehicle was related to the
arrest offense and authorized by statute. In Cooper the Court pointed to Preston v.
United States. 376 U.S. 364 (1964), where police had searched a vehicle impounded
following the driver's arrest for vagrancy, as an invalid search, unauthorized by statute
and in no way related to the arrest offense of vagrancy. The Court, in Dyke v. Taylor
Implement Mfg. Co.. 391 U.S. 216 (1968), continued to stress that the legality of the
impoundment is the key to the legality of the search: the vehicle must be lawfully
within police custody and the search of the car must be intended to implement that
custody. The nature of the driver's offense appears to be of no real consequence. If
local ordinances require that an automobile be impounded following the driver's arrest.
no matter what the offense, then an inventory search made to safeguard the vehicle's
contents would be a reasonable search under Cooper and Dyke.
83. The Washington Court of Appeals in State v. Shoemaker. I I Wn. App. 187.
191, 522 P.2d 203, 207 (1974), strictly limited the right of the state patrol to search a
vehicle incident to a traffic arrest (stop for defective tail light): "Even if there had been
an arrest, on the facts then known to the officers, no search of the vehicle would have
been justified."
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IV. CONCLUSION
The question of the constitutionality of a full search of the person
incident to custodial arrest had not been presented to the Supreme
Court prior to Robinson and Gustafson. In upholding full arrest
searches, Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion attempted to overcome
the traditional scope limitations placed on such searches. Previous
decisions had authorized a warrantless search of the arrestee's person
and the immediately surrounding area only insofar as required to fur-
ther the arresting officer's need for self-protection and duty to pre-
serve evidence; as neither of these two justifications was present in the
factual situations presented, the continued validity of traditional limi-
tations on the scope of search deserved careful analysis.
The majority's attempt to circumvent these limitations is not per-
suasive. Justice Rehnquist simply rejected limitation of searches to
accomplishment of these two purposes as "novel," a description incon-
sistent with language in prior cases, some of which he had quoted in
the Robinson opinion. Moreover, justifying governmental intrusions
upon personal liberties by arguing that since such intrusions are not
prohibited they must be permissible seems to put the matter back-
wards. Justice Rehnquist also painstakingly distinguished Terry,
which placed strict limitations on the scope of stop-and-frisk searches,
but summarily dismissed its companion case, Peters, which was more
in point. Lost in all this defensive maneuvering was the offering of
any positive justification for a full search of the arrestee incident to a
custodial arrest.
While result oriented decisions are not uncommon in the Supreme
Court, the absence of a reasoned justification for the Robinson and
Gustafson holdings may diminish their future impact. Most courts are
wary of warrantless searches and carefully scrutinize any asserted jus-
tifications. This judicial skepticism, developed through decades of
fourth amendment decisions, should survive the Court's decisions last
Term; a prosecutor attempting to extend further the scope of incident
searches will have to look beyond Robinson and Gustafson for a justi-
fication.
David C. Anson
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